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Banking spatially on the future: capital switching, 
infrastructure and the ecological fix 
Abstract 
Since the onset of the global economic crisis, financiers and the institutions regulating their 
behavior have been subject to far-reaching criticism. At the same time, leading geo-scientists have 
been insisting that future environmental change may be far more profound than previously 
anticipated. Finance capital has long been a crucial mechanism for melting present solidities into 
air so as to create different futures. This article asks what the prospects are for the switching of 
credit money into green infrastructures – a switching increasingly recognized as necessary for 
climate change mitigation and (especially) adaptation. Most research into geographies of finance 
has ignored ecological questions while few contemporary society-nature researchers examine 
major fixed-capital investments. Unlike those geographers who criticize capitalism without 
offering feasible alternatives, we take a pragmatic view underpinned by democratic socio-
environmental values and attempt to identify leverage points for meaningful change. This 
programmatic article identifies reasons and examples to be cautiously hopeful that liquidity can 
be fixed in less ecologically-harmful future infrastructures, thereby addressing crucial extra-
economic challenges for the century ahead. 
 
Keywords Finance capital; infrastructure; capital switching; climate change; regulation 
 
Introduction 
Given the inherent unknowability of the future, foreseeing its socio-ecological 
parameters and possibilities is a challenging task at the best of times. However, 
notwithstanding all the future uncertainties with we which we must deal, two things 
are increasingly clear. The first is that anthropogenic climate change is occurring and 
to a degree likely to prove “game changing” for most countries worldwide. The second 
is that such change will necessitate significant, pro-active socio-economic 
reconfigurations that both respect, and yet also help to write, the new rules of the 
ecological game. One such vector of reconfiguration, and the one considered in this 
article, pertains to the built environment – that is, to those long-lasting, expensive-
to-construct physical infrastructures that both enable and constrain the quotidian 
activities involved in reproducing social life.  
In what specific senses does anthropogenic climate change call for such 
reconfiguration? For several years analysts and policymakers have talked incessantly 
about “mitigation” and “adaptation” strategies. In respect of infrastructural changes, 
Pacala and Socolow (2004) have argued influentially that a rapid reconfiguration of 
the existing built environment – prioritizing “efficient buildings” – can contribute 
substantially to limiting future atmospheric warming. However, given the relative 
failure of most national governments to pursue mitigation strategies aggressively, 
adaptation is now at least as vital thinking ahead. The recent (fifth) assessment report 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2013) indicates with high 
certainty that an average atmospheric temperate rise of as much as 4 degrees Celsius 
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by century’s end is possible. In this light, it is hard to disagree with Nathan Sayre’s 
contention that “A rapid and comprehensive reconfiguration of the built environment 
is imperative if we are to … adapt to global warming” (2010, 95). Sayre then goes on 
to identify what we agree is a pivotal question: that of how, and by whom, a 
comprehensive remaking of built environments might be financed. 
Drawing on David Harvey’s (1982) seminal work on the distinctive political 
economy of major fixed-capital investment, Sayre reminds us that the built 
environment “depends heavily on financial instruments and institutions that permit 
large-scale borrowing and long-term amortization” (2010, 102). Recognizing such 
economic distinctiveness, our article’s contribution to the imagination of socio-
ecological futures is to explore how, in principle, the financing of major new 
infrastructure might work, and to consider how likely such financing is to eventuate 
soon. Notwithstanding the tarnished image financiers have because of the global 
financial crisis and its fall-out (plus various high-profile scandals), their decisions will 
be crucial in determining the road humanity will travel in the decades to come. There 
is a need for analysts and policymakers not only to understand these decisions but to 
shape them in order to realize important non-economic goals. In effect, the financial 
sector is an unelected government whose power is such that it needs to be carefully 
governed through a set of endogenous and exogenous norms, rules and institutions. In 
respect of infrastructure, one might say that (some) financiers are the ultimate 
geographers, literally graphing the face of the earth as they translate liquidity into 
enduring fixed assets essential to our shared future. To use another metaphor, in 
designing the arteries through which future capital will flow, these financiers stand to 
determine the future health not only of ‘the economy’, but of the bodies social and 
ecological too. 
Normatively, and contrary to much geographical research into human-
environment relationships, our explicit aim is to offer an even-handed appraisal of 
the possibilities capitalism offers for enabling humanity – or significant parts of 
humanity – to cope with what is likely to be an ecologically challenging future. 
Consider here differing uses of the word “fix”, which completes our article’s title. For 
many critical geographers (and we consider ourselves such), the word usually has 
negative, even pejorative, connotations over-and-above its explanatory meanings. In 
the context of our current political economy, a fix is typically seen as capitalism trying 
to negotiate its inherent crisis tendencies so as to reproduce itself in perennially 
iniquitous forms. Thus, for Erik Swyngedouw (2010, 222), capitalist enthusiasm for 
‘eco-technologies’ like smart energy meters is essentially about “producing a socio-
ecological fix to make sure nothing really changes. Stabilizing the climate seems to be 
a condition for capitalist life as we know it to continue.” We do not diminish such 
concerns. But here we use the word ‘fix’ differently to denote the possibility of an 
ecologically- and socially-progressive reconfiguration of existing built environments. 
Such a fix can never be problem-free, and what counts as “progressive” is relative to 
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be sure. Moreover, naïve optimism should never substitute for reasoned and realistic 
hope that certain specific varieties of capitalism can deliver wider socio-ecological 
benefits for more than just a few. But equally, as J-K Gibson-Graham has argued 
consistently (e.g. 2008), such hope is absent when critics see capitalism as little more 
than a malign and impregnable force that disadvantages the majority of humanity. In 
sum, this is a programmatic article intended to highlight real-world issues pertaining 
to future infrastructure financing and to inspire thought among geographers about 
how they choose to examine these issues looking ahead. 
Anthropogenic climate change and capital switching  
In 2012 the British government, in the shape of the Department for Environment, 
Food & Rural Affairs, published the first of its new five-yearly Climate Change Risk 
Assessment reports (Defra, 2012). Among other things, the document was notable for 
highlighting perceived “priorities for adaptation” under five headings, one of which 
was ‘Buildings & Infrastructure.’ This identification of the need for built-environment 
renewal reflects increasingly widespread consensus, not only in the U.K. but 
internationally, regarding the centrality of infrastructure upgrade to what Defra calls 
“climate resilience” (flooding and overheating of buildings being seen as the most 
significant risks in the British case). But there is also, as already intimated, a 
perceived role in climate change mitigation. Defra’s conviction that building a “new 
low carbon infrastructure” can assist in “the transition to a low carbon economy” is 
underpinned by the fact that, in Sayre’s (2010, 95) words, the existing built 
environment “mediates economic production, exchange and consumption in ways 
that both presuppose and reinforce high rates of greenhouse gas emissions.” 
Given the growing acceptance that our infrastructures need to be substantially 
redesigned and renewed, planners and other experts are turning their attention to the 
critical question of what more resilient and energy-efficient ones might look like. This 
is not the place to consider this question in any detail. Suffice to say that the 
proposals which are now beginning to emerge share two main attributes. First, there 
is a strong emphasis on coastal regions, where the impact of rising sea levels will be 
most pronounced. Second, there is an emphasis on cities, reflecting the fact that the 
world’s built environment is primarily urban. Brian Stone’s (2012) The City and the 
Coming Climate is a good example: it makes concrete proposals for new energy, 
residential and transport infrastructures under the ‘coming’ climate and associated 
physical geography. 
Alongside such envisionings of future built environments, we are also seeing 
tentative appraisals of the potential costs thereof. Such costs, needless to say, will be 
colossal, and their quantification at this juncture is challenging. For example, a recent 
report (Hallegatte et al., 2013), assuming a mean sea-level rise of 0.2-0.4 meters by 
2050, and seeking to quantify the impact of flooding on the world’s 136 largest 
coastal cities, estimated necessary infrastructure adaptation costs at a cumulative 
4 
 
US$50 billion per annum. The authors stress, however, that while such figures may 
sound high, they are “far below [their] estimate of aggregate damage losses per year 
in the absence of adaptation” (ibid., 805). This qualifier echoes the now famous 
conclusion of the Stern Review (2007) that the relative economic costs of inaction 
vastly outweigh those of acting meaningfully now.  
All of this tells us that the redesigning and rebuilding of infrastructures will 
require a long-lasting diversion of financial investment from existing uses. Global 
society, in other words, will have to effect a massive “capital switch”. Harvey (1978) 
conceptualized this as the process whereby investment is re-routed from one “circuit 
of capital” to another. He was most interested in the case where the switch is from the 
“primary”circuit of “productive” capital (investment in the wage-labor-based 
production of goods and services for sale on the market) to the “secondary” circuit of 
investment in the (re)construction of built environments (e.g. roads and factories). 
This begins to explain the appeal of the ‘capital switch’ optic for us here. It refers to 
large-scale, temporally-concentrated diversions of investment that serve to alter 
systematically the historically-contingent forms that capitalism assumes. It is just 
such diversions that are pivotal to global attempts to cope with future climate change. 
       Such switches have certainly happened before – indeed Harvey regards them as 
part of capitalism’s metaphorical DNA. As such, the general dynamics of the 
“ecological” switch envisioned in this article would not be unprecedented, even if its 
magnitude might be. Such a switch would involve protecting existing “natural capital” 
(e.g. large areas of forest, today reframed as providers of “ecosystem services’), 
creating “green infrastructure” en masse, and fabricating built environments 
designed to cope with higher sea levels, warmer temperatures and so on. Yet, as 
theorized by Harvey and examined by scholars mobilizing his theoretical lens, capital 
switching is ultimately a function of short-term capitalist profit-seeking. It is, at 
heart, a response to an immediate crisis of economic capital (specifically, a crisis of 
over-accumulation, and thus of surplus capital in search of a “home”). At best, it also 
provides a temporary “fix” to the crisis tendencies necessitating it. This being so, how 
can we foresee a switch necessitated in large part for ecological reasons and with the 
long-term viability of biophysical goods and services as a key motivation? If not from 
an acute dearth of current opportunities for profitable investment in the “productive” 
circuit, and thus for ongoing economic growth, where will the impetus to switching 
come from (and over what timescale)? Additionally, how enduring will the 
infrastructural products of such a switch, should it and they eventuate, prove to be? 
We do not pretend to know the answers. But on several accounts the theory and 
historical reality of capital switching suggest that the ‘fix’ envisioned here is not 
unimaginable. First, if Harvey is right, capital switching occurs necessarily – it 
happens regardless of the “extra-economic” reasons that may be used to encourage, 
or justify, such a switch. Second, when “extra-economic” factors come to have serious 
economic consequences they become internalized within the “logic” of capitalism. To 
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quote Sayre once more on infrastructure, “… by a fortuitous paradox, these [fixed 
capital] investments are threatened with devaluation whether or not we act to 
stabilize atmospheric GHG concentrations; in highly uneven, unpredictable, and 
potentially abrupt ways, global warming will make our current built environment 
increasingly untenable and uneconomical” (2010, 95). This is a reminder that capital 
functions in a world that never was, nor will ever be, designed to meet the changing 
“needs” of this mode of production. Third, financial institutions have long been 
accustomed to translating short-term money-making opportunities into the sort of 
long-term commitments needed to build and maintain something like a nuclear 
power facility. Given the right incentives by governments, financiers are well capable 
of crafting investment vehicles to help decarbonize the world’s current infrastructural 
assets. 
Fourth, and relatedly, though global capitalism remains broadly neoliberal, 
national governments retain the power to radically alter the regulatory conditions 
that define “rational” and permissible financial activities. They also, of course, can be 
direct participants in a capital switch by choosing to make large public investments. 
Even ‘night watchman’ states have some more than nominal sense of the public 
interest, not least because civil society actors force them to look beyond the 
immediate needs of business. In the present case, an increasingly large and vocal 
community of geoscientists is urging governments to take global environmental 
change far more seriously than heretofore. Alarmed by the so-far weak attempts to 
decarbonize the world economy, these geoscientists are sounding a drum-beat of 
alarm intended to be heard by leading politicians (see, for instance, The Stockholm 
Memorandum, 2011). Their concerns are echoed by leading NGOs, foundations and 
charities, and are part of a wider questioning of contemporary capitalism that 
precedes the recent financial meltdown. The fact that none of this is at all new – 
indeed, it is all-too-familiar – helps to create the material preconditions for the sort 
of policy shift that will be one “form of appearance” of the causal necessity Harvey’s 
switching idea identifies. In short, if capital switching can never be a purely economic 
affair, there are general reasons to believe causal necessity and contingent causality 
might fortuitously combine to reconfigure capitalism’s operating “hardware” along 
more “ecofriendly” lines. These reasons may not be sufficient to win any argument on 
the subject, but neither should they be dismissed. 
Of course, should such a reconfiguration occur two important distributional 
questions arise. First, because the scope and scale of contemporary capitalism is 
unprecedented, the infrastructural transformation being envisaged here could not 
simply be regional in scale. It would have to be global, raising the question: how 
feasible is this? Second, as several commentators have shown (e.g. Graham and 
Marvin, 2001), many contemporary infrastructures offer declining “public goods” 
functions as they are increasingly targeted to privileged social groups. In this regard it 
is clearly not hard to imagine a bleak future in which new ecologically-resilient 
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infrastructures serve – and generate economic growth for – only those few who can 
pay for them. This therefore begs a second question: can a different future eventuate? 
Again, there are general reasons to believe that both questions can be answered 
in the affirmative. First, unless capitalism were to deglobalise through force of 
circumstance, its future trajectory virtually requires the coincident alteration of 
infrastructures across continental boundaries. The time-space compression that is 
one of capitalism’s hallmarks typically forges built environments conducive to 
commodity circulation on the largest possible scale at any one historical moment. 
Barriers to circulation are typically overcome because they are both opportunities for 
and drags on productive investment. Second, though in many places future 
infrastructures will likely not bring benefits to a great many citizens (see the next 
section for more on this), in many other cases a grass-roots Polanyian counter-
movement against such exclusion is conceivable. In still other cases non-neoliberal 
governments may have strong public-interest agendas; and we should remember, too, 
that capital ultimately suffers (indeed, faces the crises that trigger switches) if too few 
people consume the things it commodifies. 
Let us now move away from these general considerations toward a more focused 
examination of how ripe finance capital is to effect the switch we have been 
discussing. The central investment issues, as we see them, are threefold and 
intimately connected.  The remainder of the article proceeds with this generic 
outlining of future financing possibilities as background:  
1. Source of funds. Here the question is a nominally simple one: who would pay? 
While funding could of course come from many different sources, the key 
generic distinction is between private and public finance. Would the rebuilding 
of our built environments be financed by private, commercial interests, or by 
the state (and thus, ultimately, various taxpayers)? While some of the new 
infrastructure would be privately-owned and revenue-generative, much of it – 
transportation infrastructures (without tolls or other user fees), coastal 
defenses, and so forth – could not and would not be. In the latter case, it is 
more difficult – though clearly not impossible – to envision a significant role 
for private capital. 
2. Nature of funds. Would the capital being invested be cash or credit? That is to 
say: would it be derived from actually-existing financial assets without 
matching liabilities, or would the funding entity be required to borrow in order 
to make the investment? An example of the former would be a pension fund or 
sovereign wealth fund (SWF). An example of the latter, at least in most 
Western countries, would be the state – as we are only too well aware, few 
Western governments today have the luxury of spending without borrowing 
first. Borrowing is likely to be essential to one degree or another. 
3. Form of investment of funds. Where the infrastructure investor and owner are 
not one and the same, would capital be invested as debt or as equity? Or, to 
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put it another way, to what types of returns would the investor be entitled – 
interest and principal repayments (debt) or payments tied to the market value 
of the investment (equity)? The latter is only conceivable in instances where 
ownership of the infrastructure is wholly or partly private, and thus would be 
likely to be relatively limited. This has significant implications, with debt and 
equity investments typically characterized by different risk profiles and 
attractive to investors with different risk appetites. 
Barriers to realization 
For all our desire to present a balanced outlook on the need and possibility of 
effecting an ecological fix underpinned by new societal infrastructures, we are 
mindful of the necessity to acknowledge the many reasons to be skeptical. In this 
section we enumerate some of the more important of these. To be clear, our concern 
here is not with technical barriers but with the obstacles that existing configurations 
of finance capital pose, and with ominous ongoing dynamics in and around current 
(financial) political economy. We identify five related sets of challenges in this 
sphere: 
1. Given that much of the new infrastructure will not be designed to be revenue-
generative, and will be publicly owned and controlled, it is difficult to imagine 
that it can be financed without a significant contribution from public sources. 
Yet we stand at a moment in history where, certainly in the Global North, public 
finances are under – or at least, are seen and asserted to be under – exceptional 
pressure. The timing, in other words, is anything but propitious: in a milieu 
where the political and public appetite for taking-on more long-term public debt 
is virtually non-existent, and, moreover, where the appetite for higher taxes (the 
other, “unmentionable” mechanism for raising funds) is equally limited, it is 
hard to see public financing as solving the problem in toto or even in large part. 
Witness, for instance, the situation in the U.S., where plans for a national 
infrastructure bank using federal funds remain stalled despite backing from 
President Obama and numerous influential senators. 
2. There is also something of a philosophical – as opposed to a political-economic 
– barrier to the notion of public financing of major infrastructure renewal. As 
O’Neill (2013) has shown, a major trend of the late 20th and early 21st centuries 
has been towards privatization of the ownership, financing and operation of 
infrastructure. In the resulting ideological-discursive environment, where “state 
responsibility for infrastructure and public acceptance for its finance and 
delivery” are “no longer intrinsic to Western capitalist ideology” (ibid. 3) in the 
way they once were, the challenges confronting future public financing of built-
environment reconstruction loom larger still. 
3. If the necessary means to finance reconstruction publicly are neither readily 
available nor perhaps readily justifiable, a different set of obstacles threatens 
the viability of private financing. Perhaps the biggest concerns the question of 
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whether investment in such reconstruction would be deemed sufficiently 
attractive (i.e. profitable). The fact that much of the new infrastructure would 
not be revenue-generative is certainly part of the problem, though private 
sources could, in theory, fund public, non-revenue-generative infrastructure if, 
for example, invested as debt rather than equity. Yet two hurdles would still 
remain. First, as Clark et al. (2012) have noted, short-termism continues to 
dominate institutional investment, even among investors who can (as 
infrastructure requires) invest over inter-generational timespans. Second, 
private investment of all types remains, for the most part, profit-maximizing 
above other considerations, whereas investment in public infrastructures with a 
climate-change-mitigation-and-adaptation remit would, by its very nature, need 
to be constituted as low-risk and low-reward. This tension is already writ-large 
in the fact that private, ecologically-oriented infrastructure financing has yet to 
substantively materialize. As Simon Zadek (2013: np) notes, if a significant 
switch is not happening now – “mechanisms like the Green Climate Fund are 
struggling to get off the ground, and have yet to offer a vision for unlocking 
capital at scale,” while major institutional investors continue to invest heavily in 
non-renewable fossil-fuel industries, remaining, collectively, “resolutely brown 
and dirty” – even with “the low cost of capital and the need to stimulate the 
global economy,” it is arguably hard to see when it will. 
4. The lack of substantive progress on the private financing front is probably also 
explicable in part by the fourth important obstacle requiring recognition: 
namely, active resistance (broadly-defined). Sayre (2010) regards one form 
thereof as particularly important: resistance from existing owners of current 
built environments to the devaluation that would necessarily accompany such 
capital’s redesign, disuse and rebuilding. (Though, as Sayre also remarks, this 
capital will be devalued regardless, by climate change, if not by proactive social 
decision-making; but who says the owners of capital are rational?). Resistance 
also emanates from other influential sources. One is the oil and gas sector, with 
its entrenched power. Another, equally powerful, is the financial services sector. 
As Zadek (2013) explains, a prerequisite for major long-term private financing 
of built-environment reconstruction is meaningful reform in and reregulation of 
financial markets. But such reforms are not even close to happening, stymied as 
regulators are by “a fierce headwind of lobbying by financial firms” (ibid.) 
deeply invested in existing institutional configurations of risk and reward. 
5. Last but not least, there is a pivotal geographical dimension to the financial 
challenge that lies ahead, and one closely bound up in complex ways with the 
distributional issues identified in the previous section. Put simply, there is 
marked geographical unevenness internationally both in the need to upgrade 
infrastructures and in the financial wherewithal to do so, rendering the 
geopolitical and geo-financial consensus and collectivity that is likely to be a 
necessary condition of success all the more difficult to achieve. Climate change, 
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as Davis (2010, 37) writes, “will produce dramatically unequal impacts across 
regions,” in the process “inflicting the greatest damage upon poor countries with 
the fewest resources for meaningful adaptation” and in a way that may 
“undermine … pro-active solidarity.” Put this concern alongside the more 
pointed fear that any climate change-related financial transfer from Global 
North to South “would be so firmly ring-fenced with conditionalities that it 
would auction away the sovereignty of African nations at the altar of ‘Green 
Capitalism’” (Tandon, 2011, 141), and the daunting difficulties of achieving a 
global capital-switch-cum-ecological-fix are clear to see. 
Grounds for cautious optimism 
With all of this said, it is not in our view sufficient – conceptually, empirically or 
politically – to leave things there: to bemoan, effectively, that capital is capital, and 
the future thus constrained by the inertia built into the current historical-geographic 
conjuncture. In amidst the undoubted grounds for skepticism, we see three main 
reasons for believing that finance capital can potentially facilitate the type of 
investment and rebuilding that is needed in the near future. These particular reasons 
can be added to the four very general ones described earlier in the article.  
First, and in many ways least significantly, there are signs of potentially 
promising developments on the ground. In its recent report on cities and what it calls 
“infrastructure transitions” (UNEP, 2013), the United Nations’ International 
Resource Panel included 30 case studies of “innovative approaches to sustainable 
infrastructure change across a broad range of urban contexts.” Wholesale 
infrastructure renewal is not just a theory, in other words. One city often mentioned 
in this context, by way of example, is Chicago. The Chicago Infrastructure Trust (CIT) 
was established in 2012 to incentivize both debt- and equity-based private financing 
of a range of infrastructure projects. Chicago is also the leader of the international 
Sustainable Infrastructure Finance Network, which is a collective initiative, also 
launched in early 2012, by the so-called C40 group of cities. 
While there does not appear to be anything particularly revolutionary about the 
financing models used in the aforementioned cases – Citibank and JP Morgan are 
both actively involved in the CIT – it is vital to appreciate, second, that different types 
of financial entity, with the potential to embrace different financing rationales, do 
exist, and are, in many cases, extremely well-capitalized. “Insurance companies, 
pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, endowments, foundations and family offices,” 
note Clark et al. (2012, 104), “all have the ability to invest over inter-generational 
spans” and in “long-term, illiquid assets” – in, most notably, infrastructure assets. 
Such investors – which Oulton (2012), in the context of the funding of a low-carbon 
future, describes collectively as constituting “patient capital” – were reported as 
having had $27 trillion in assets under management in 2011 (Clark et al. 2012, 104). 
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SWFs appear to represent an especially encouraging investor type. For one 
thing, they occupy a “unique position” among investors insofar as they are “not 
constrained by liabilities” or “subject to increasing solvency requirements.” 
Furthermore, they typically have “greater discretion over tactical and strategic asset 
allocation,” which explains why they are often described as “unconstrained investors” 
(Clark et al., 2013, 8-9). Of especial interest in relation to our own hypothesized 
capital switch and the alternative ‘rewards’ profile that financing thereof would be 
likely to exhibit – lower financial returns, but higher social-collectivist, non-monetary 
ones – is the ‘moralist’ SWF sub-category identified by Clark et al. Such funds 
include, inter alia, Australia’s Future Fund and Norway’s Government Pension Fund-
Global. The former has an obligation to ensure that its investments are ‘sustainable’ 
in the sense of not harming the prospects of future generations; the latter represents 
“an expression of Norway’s commitment to global justice” (ibid., 64, 68). Both would 
seem, at least from the outside, possible participants in a broadly-based ecological-fix 
financing initiative. 
Third, finally, and perhaps most significantly of all, it is possible to identify 
precedents for socially-progressive, large-scale, infrastructure-oriented capital 
switches. In other words, it has – sort of – been done before, even if not on the same 
scale, and even if not with specifically environmental ends. One such precedent is 
discussed briefly now; we think others are equally pertinent, but space constraints 
preclude their elaboration.1 Our aim here is not to advance particular financing 
models to be replicated but to highlight an historical-geographical achievement – of 
political will as much as financial innovation – in the face of socio-economic need 
from which we can hopefully learn. 
This particular example is somewhat ironic in the present context, given the 
environmental implications it ultimately had, but it is instructive nonetheless. It is a 
case very much of “market failure”. When the mass-market provision of electricity 
was rolled out in the U.S. in the 1910s and 1920s, rural areas were largely neglected: 
the economics of building-out infrastructure to dwellings and farms not clustered 
together could not be made to work from the service providers’ perspective, meaning 
that only those end-users able to advance the necessary financing themselves were 
initially connected up. The result was that by 1930 only approximately 10 percent of 
American farms had electricity, whilst rural electrification levels had reached in 
excess of 50 percent in countries including Czechoslovakia, France and Germany 
(Brown, 1980, 16-17). 
                                                          
1 An important contemporary example of a substantial capital switch geared to financing infrastructure with 
a ‘social’ orientation (broadly defined), for instance, is that of European social housing, where in many 
countries innovative financing methods (e.g. the government acting as loan guarantor) have partially 
arrested the decline in social housing construction widely associated with the state’s withdrawal from direct 
provision and with housing associations’ growing reliance on otherwise expensive private financing. 
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The Great Depression put ambitions for rural electrification on hold, but from 
1934 renewed impetus was provided by two men in particular: President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt (who had been an outspoken advocate of rural electrification as Governor 
of New York state) and the engineer Morris Cooke, both of whom recognized the 
importance of electrification to rural economic and social life. The latter was the 
author of a hugely influential report which estimated the cost of comprehensive rural 
electrification and made proposals for how it could be financed – a report which 
Cooke later referred to as “the detonating force which started rural electrification” 
(ibid. 42). 
 In 1935, the Rural Electrification Administration (REA) was established. In 
time, the specific financing model used would come to be seen as critical to the 
program’s success. The REA was, effectively, a funding agency. It did not procure and 
install infrastructure itself – instead, it provided loans to those who did, among 
whom were both private companies and, most significantly, cooperatives, which were 
formed (on a strictly not-for-profit basis) by rural residents to build distribution 
systems and provide their own electrical services. The REA’s loans, towards which 
Congress in 1936 made available a maximum of $410m over 10 years, featured three 
key (connected) components: federal subsidization; low (since subsidized) interest 
rates; and repayment schedules designed to match, in temporal terms, the timeframe 
(decades rather than years or months) over which the “returns” on investment would 
be realized by borrowers. 
 What was the outcome of the REA? As early as 1939, it had 417 cooperatives 
serving 268,000 rural households. After this initial burst of borrowing and 
investment, the pace of uptake slackened off during wartime before then picking up 
again from 1945. By 1953, “over 2.5 million farms were connected to REA and for all 
practical purposes, all American farmers had electricity, whether through REA or 
otherwise” (Schurr, 1990, 234); and Brown (1980, x), bringing the story up to the end 
of the 1970s, reported a default rate on REA loans since the agency’s genesis of less 
than one percent. 
Conclusion: from bad debt to healthy credit, from present liquidity to 
future solidities 
It must be admitted that now is a particularly challenging time to be arguing for the 
positive potential of finance capital in making alternative socio-ecological futures. It 
goes against the grain of the bulk of writing on environmental questions in critical 
human and environmental geography. Moreover, debt has gotten a particularly bad 
name in the past five years in governmental and public spheres. 
But finance capital, including credit creation, will be crucial to enabling us to 
adapt to a changing biophysical world and to mitigating some of that change. In 
particular, and in line with the focus of this article, built environments will need to be 
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substantially reformatted and constituted afresh. Unless capitalism is replaced by 
another mode of production altogether (and, on some accounts, even if it is), this 
cannot be done without putting finance capital to work. Granted, such capital is in 
many of its forms centrally bound-up with capitalism’s most exploitative and 
ecologically harmful circuits. We refuse to accept, however, that it must always be so 
or at least to the degree some critics suggest. We acknowledge that there are 
significant obstacles to an ecologically- and socially-progressive mobilization in the 
service of the “capital switch” envisioned here, yet we see signs of hope, not least in 
historical (and contemporary) examples of finance being put to extra-economic ends. 
The often-sweeping condemnation of finance capital, and debt in particular, 
therefore needs revisiting. In recent years, few books have done more to give debt its 
bad name than David Graeber’s (2011) eponymous history. As such, we will conclude 
by citing from a review of this weighty monograph which, while recognizing its many 
merits, calls for research and thinking about “healthy credit” alongside “bad debt.” It 
is a sentiment, in the context of socio-ecological futures, with which we fully concur: 
This hefty treatise on bad debt shows the need for further work on healthy credit. … 
[We can denounce] capitalist “gambling”. Yet all investment in future facilities involves 
an element of uncertainty and a claim on resources. Governments can conjure the 
needed money out of thin air if those investments turn out to meet a genuine and 
effective social need. Capitalists are often not very good at spotting and sponsoring 
necessary social innovations, especially those which require large-scale and 
complementary infrastructure. Public enterprise – carried out on a broad and varied 
canvas – is the vital missing ingredient in a world dogged by indebtedness, weak 
demand, climate catastrophe, poverty, crumbling infrastructure and counter-
productive austerity (Blackburn, 2013, 150).  
In this light, we might hope that leading governments will help finance capital 
realize its profound potential to remake the arteries through which capital flows and 
which are the lifeblood of the biological and social reproduction of most of 
contemporary humanity. Indeed, we need far-sighted state action because, in most 
parts of the world, we lack collective agents capable of forcing the hand of (often 
unwilling or ham-strung) governments. We might hope, too, that more social 
scientists, including many human geographers, can be generative of transformative 
ideas, evidence and proposals geared to creating a future we would like our 
successors to inherit. To help change the world for the better we may, as Karen 
O’Brien (2013) recently opined, have to change our own modus operandi. A critical 
geography of finance capital and infrastructural transformation clearly cannot and 
should not be a Polyanna, but neither can it afford to remain analytically skeptical or 
normatively gloomy about the prospects for a greener and more socially just 
capitalism. 
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